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Abstract
High sensitivity of neural networks against malicious perturbations on inputs causes
security concerns. To take a steady step towards robust classifiers, we aim to create
neural network models provably defended from perturbations. Prior certification
work requires strong assumptions on network structures and massive computational
costs, and thus the range of their applications was limited. From the relationship be-
tween the Lipschitz constants and prediction margins, we present a computationally
efficient calculation technique to lower-bound the size of adversarial perturbations
that can deceive networks, and that is widely applicable to various complicated
networks. Moreover, we propose an efficient training procedure that robustifies
networks and significantly improves the provably guarded areas around data points.
In experimental evaluations, our method showed its ability to provide a non-trivial
guarantee and enhance robustness for even large networks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are highly vulnerable against intentionally created small perturbations on inputs
[36], called adversarial perturbations, which cause serious security concerns in applications such
as self-driving cars. Adversarial perturbations in object recognition systems have been intensively
studied [36, 12, 7], and we mainly target the object recognition systems.
One approach to defend from adversarial perturbations is to mask gradients. Defensive distillation
[29], which distills networks into themselves, is one of the most prominent methods. However, Carlini
and Wagner [7] showed that we can create adversarial perturbations that deceive networks trained with
defensive distillation. Input transformations and detections [40, 14] are some other defense strategies,
although we can bypass them [6]. Adversarial training [12, 20, 23], which injects adversarially
perturbed data into training data, is a promising approach. However, there is a risk of overfitting to
attacks [20, 37]. Many other heuristics have been developed to make neural networks insensitive
against small perturbations on inputs. However, recent work has repeatedly succeeded to create
adversarial perturbations for networks protected with heuristics in the literature [1]. For instance,
Athalye et al. [2] reported that many ICLR 2018 defense papers did not adequately protect networks
soon after the announcement of their acceptance. This indicates that even protected networks can
be unexpectedly vulnerable, which is a crucial problem for this specific line of research because the
primary concern of these studies is security threats.
The literature indicates the difficulty of defense evaluations. Thus, our goal is to ensure the lower
bounds on the size of adversarial perturbations that can deceive networks for each input. Many
existing approaches, which we cover in Sec. 2, are applicable only for special-structured small
networks. On the other hand, common networks used in evaluations of defense methods are wide,
which makes prior methods computationally intractable and complicated, which makes some prior
methods inapplicable. This work tackled this problem, and we provide a widely applicable, yet,
highly scalable method that ensures large guarded areas for a wide range of network structures.
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The existence of adversarial perturbations indicates that the slope of the loss landscape around data
points is large, and we aim to bound the slope. An intuitive way to measure the slope is to calculate
the size of the gradient of a loss with respect to an input. However, it is known to provide a false
sense of security [37, 7, 2]. Thus, we require upper-bounds of the gradients. The next candidate is to
calculate a local Lipschitz constant, that is the maximum size of the gradients around each data point.
Even though this can provide certification, calculating the Lipschitz constant is computationally
hard. We can obtain it in only small networks or get its approximation, which cannot provide
certification [15, 39, 11]. A coarser but available alternative is to calculate the global Lipschitz
constant. However, prior work could provide only magnitudes of smaller certifications compared to
the usual discretization of images even for small networks [36, 30]. We show that we can overcome
such looseness with our improved and unified bounds and a developed training procedure. The
training procedure is more general and effective than previous approaches [8, 41]. We empirically
observed that the training procedure also improves robustness against current attack methods.
2 Related work
In this section, we review prior work to provide certifications for networks. One of the popular
approaches is restricting discussion to networks using ReLU [25] exclusively as their activation
functions and reducing the verification problem to some other well-studied problems. Bastani et al.
[4] encoded networks to linear programs, Katz et al. [17, 16] reduced the problem to Satisfiability
Modulo Theory, and Raghunathan et al. [31] encoded networks to semidefinite programs. However,
these formulations demand prohibitive computational costs and their applications are limited to only
small networks. As a relatively tractable method, Kolter and Wong [19] has bounded the influence
of `∞-norm bounded perturbations using convex outer-polytopes. However, it is still hard to scale
this method to deep or wide networks. Another approach is assuming smoothness of networks and
losses. Hein and Andriushchenko [15] focused on local Lipschitz constants of neural networks around
each input. However, the guarantee is provided only for networks with one hidden layer. Sinha
et al. [34] proposed a certifiable procedure of adversarial training. However, smoothness constants,
which their certification requires, are usually unavailable or infinite. As a concurrent work, Ruan
et al. [32] proposed another algorithm to certify robustness with more scalable manner than previous
approaches. We note that our algorithm is still significantly faster.
3 Problem formulation
We define the threat model, our defense goal, and basic terminologies.
Threat model: LetX be a data point from data distributionD and its true label be tX ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
where K is the number of classes. Attackers create a new data point similar to X which deceives
defenders’ classifiers. In this paper, we consider the `2-norm as a similarity measure between data
points because it is one of the most common metrics [24, 7].
Let c be a positive constant and F be a classifier. We assume that the output of F is a vector F (X)
and the classifier predicts the label with argmaxi∈{1,...,K}{F (X)i}, where F (X)i denotes the i-th
element of F (X). Now, we define adversarial perturbation F,X as follows.
F,X ∈
{

∣∣∣∣∣‖‖2 < c ∧ tX 6= argmaxi∈{1,...,K} {F (X + )i}
}
.
Defense goal: We define a guarded area for a network F and a data point X as a hypersphere with
a radius c that satisfies the following condition:
∀,
(
‖‖2 < c ⇒ tX = argmax
i∈{1,...,K}
{F (X + )i}
)
. (1)
This condition (1) is always satisfied when c = 0. Our goal is to ensure that neural networks have
larger guarded areas for data points in data distribution.
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4 Calculation and enlargement of guarded area
In this section, we first describe basic concepts for calculating the provably guarded area defined in
Sec. 3. Next, we outline our training procedure to enlarge the guarded area.
4.1 Lipschitz constant and guarded area
We explain how to calculate the guarded area using the Lipschitz constant. If LF bounds the Lipschitz
constant of neural network F , we have the following from the definition of the Lipschitz constant:
‖F (X)− F (X + )‖2 ≤ LF ‖‖2.
Note that if the last layer of F is softmax, we only need to consider the subnetwork before the softmax
layer. We introduce the notion of prediction margin MF,X :
MF,X := F (X)tX −max
i 6=tX
{F (X)i}.
This margin has been studied in relationship to generalization bounds [21, 3, 28]. Using the prediction
margin, we can prove the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1.
(MF,X ≥
√
2LF ‖‖2)⇒ (MF,X+ ≥ 0). (2)
The details of the proof are in Appendix A. Thus, perturbations smaller than MF,X/
(√
2LF
)
cannot deceive the network F for a data point X . Proposition 1 sees network F as a function with a
multidimensional output. This connects the Lipschitz constant of a network, which has been discussed
in Szegedy et al. [36] and Cisse et al. [8], with the absence of adversarial perturbations. If we cast
the problem to a set of functions with a one-dimensional output, we can obtain a variant of Prop. 1.
Assume that the last layer before softmax in F is a fully-connected layer and wi is the i-th raw of its
weight matrix. Let Lsub be a Lipschitz constant of a sub-network of F before the last fully-connected
layer. We obtain the following proposition directly from the definition of the Lipschitz constant
[15, 39].
Proposition 2.
(∀i, (FtX − Fi ≥ Lsub‖wtX − wi‖2‖‖2))⇒ (MF,X+ ≥ 0). (3)
We can use either Prop. 1 or Prop. 2 for the certification. Calculations of the Lipschitz constant,
which is not straightforward in large and complex networks, will be explained in Sec. 5.
4.2 Guarded area enlargement
To ensure non-trivial guarded areas, we propose a training procedure that enlarges the provably
guarded area.
Lipschitz-margin training: To encourage conditions Eq.(2) or Eq.(3) to be satisfied with the
training data, we convert them into losses. We take Eq.(2) as an example. To make Eq.(2) satisfied
for perturbations with `2-norm larger than c, we require the following condition.
∀i 6= tX , (FtX ≥ Fi +
√
2cLF ). (4)
Thus, we add
√
2cLF to all elements in logits except for the index corresponding to tX . In training, we
calculate an estimation of the upper bound of LF with a computationally efficient and differentiable
way and use it instead of LF . Hyperparameter c is specified by users. We call this training procedure
Lipschitz-margin training (LMT). The algorithm is provided in Figure 1. Using Eq.(3) instead
of Eq.(2) is straightforward. Small additional techniques to make LMT more stable is given in
Appendix E.
Interpretation of LMT: From the former paragraph, we can see that LMT maximizes the number
of training data points that have larger guarded areas than c, as long as the original training procedure
maximizes the number of them that are correctly classified. We experimentally evaluate its general-
ization to test data in Sec. 6. The hyperparameter c is easy to interpret and easy to tune. The larger
3
c we specify, the stronger invariant property the trained network will have. However, this does not
mean that the trained network always has high accuracy against noisy examples. To see this, consider
the case where c is extremely large. In such a case, constant functions become an optimal solution.
We can interpret LMT as an interpolation between the original function, which is highly expressive
but extremely non-smooth, and constant functions, which are robust and smooth.
Computational costs: A main computational overhead of LMT is the calculation of the Lipschitz
constant. We show in Sec. 5 that its computational cost is almost the same as increasing the batch size
by one. Since we typically have tens or hundreds of samples in a mini-batch, this cost is negligible.
5 Calculation of the Lipschitz constant
In this section, we first describe a method to calculate upper bounds of the Lipschitz constant. We
bound the Lipschitz constant of each component and recursively calculate the overall bound. The
concept is from Szegedy et al. [36]. While prior work required separate analysis for slightly different
components [36, 30, 8, 32], we provide a more unified analysis. Furthermore, we provide a fast
calculation algorithm for both the upper bounds and their differentiable approximation.
5.1 Composition, addition, and concatenation
We describe the relationships between the Lipschitz constants and some functionals which frequently
appears in deep neural networks: composition, addition, and concatenation. Let f and g be functions
with Lipschitz constants bounded by L1 and L2, respectively. The Lipschitz constant of output for
each functional is bounded as follows:
composition f ◦ g : L1 · L2, addition f + g : L1 + L2, concatenation (f, g) :
√
L21 + L
2
2.
5.2 Major Components
We describe bounds of the Lipschitz constants of major layers commonly used in image recognition
tasks. We note that we can ignore any bias parameters because they do not change the Lipschitz
constants of each layer.
Linear layers in general: Fully-connected, convolutional and normalization layers are typically
linear operations at inference time. For instance, batch-normalization is a multiplication of a diagonal
matrix whose i-th element is γi/
√
σ2i + , where γi, σ
2
i ,  are a scaling parameter, running average
of variance, and a constant, respectively. Since the composition of linear operators is also linear, we
can jointly calculate the Lipschitz constant of some common pairs of layers such as convolution +
batch-normalization. By using the following theorem, we proposed a more unified algorithm than
Yoshida and Miyato [41].
Theorem 1. Let φ be a linear operator from Rn to Rm, where n <∞ and m <∞. We initialize a
vector u ∈ Rn from a Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. When we iteratively apply the
Algorithm 1: Lipschitz-margin training
hyperparam :c : required robustness
input :X : image, tX : label of X
y ← Forward(X);
L←CalcLipschitzConst();
foreach index i:
if i 6= tX :
yi +=
√
2Lc;
p← SoftmaxIfNecessary(y);
`← CalcLoss(p, tX );
Figure 1: Lipschitz-margin training algorithm
when we use Prop. 1.
Algorithm 2: Calculation of operator norm
input :u : array at previous iteration
target :f : linear function
u← u/‖u‖2;
// σ is an approximated spectral norm;
σ ← ‖f(u)‖2;
L← CalcLipschitzConst(σ);
`← CalcLoss(L);
u← ∂`∂u ;
Figure 2: Calculation of the spectral norm of
linear components at training time.
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following update formula, the `2-norm of u converges to the square of the operator norm of φ in
terms of `2-norm, almost surely.
u← u/‖u‖2, v ← φ(u), u← 1
2
∂‖v‖22
∂u
.
The proof is found in Appendix C.1. The algorithm for training time is provided in Figure 2. At
training time, we need only one iteration of the above update formula as with Yoshida and Miyato
[41]. Note that for estimation of the operator norm for a forward path, we do not require to use
gradients. In a convolutional layer, for instance, we do not require another convolution operation or
transposed convolution. We only need to increase the batch size by one. The wide availability of
our calculation method will be especially useful when more complicated linear operators than usual
convolution appear in the future. Since we want to ensure that the calculated bound is an upper-bound
for certification, we can use the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let ‖φ‖2 and Rk be an operator norm of a function φ in terms of the `2-norm and the
`2-norm of the vector u at the k-th iteration, where each element u is initialized by a Gaussian with
zero mean and unit variance. With probability higher than 1−√2/pi, the error between ‖φ‖22 and
Rk is smaller than (∆k +
√
∆k(4Rk + ∆k))/2, where ∆k := (Rk −Rk−1)n.
The proof is in Appendix C.3, which is mostly from Friedman [10]. If we use a large batch for the
power iteration, the probability becomes exponentially closer to one. We can also use singular value
decomposition as another way for accurate calculation. Despite its simplicity, the obtained bound for
convolutional layers is much tighter than the previous results in Peck et al. [30] and Cisse et al. [8],
and that for normalization layers is novel. We numerically confirm the improvement of bounds in
Sec. 6.
Pooling and activation: First, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Define f(Z) = (f1(Z1), f2(Z2), ..., fΛ(ZΛ)), where Zλ ⊂ Z and ‖fλ‖2 ≤ L for all
λ. Then,
‖f‖2 ≤
√
nL,
where n := maxj |{λ|xj ∈ Zλ}| and xj is the j-th element of x.
The proof, whose idea comes from Cisse et al. [8], is found in Appendix D.1. The exact form of n
in the pooling and convolutional layers is given in Appendix D.3. The assumption in Theorem 3
holds for most layers of networks for image recognition tasks, including pooling layers, convolutional
layers, and activation functions. Careful counting of n leads to improved bounds on the relationship
between the Lipschitz constant of a convolutional layer and the spectral norm of its reshaped kernel
from the previous result [8].
Corollary 1. Let ‖Conv‖2 be the operator norm of a convolutional layer in terms of the `2-norm,
and ‖W ′‖2 be the spectral norm of a matrix where the kernel of the convolution is reshaped into a
matrix with the same number of rows as its output channel size. Assume that the width and the height
of its input before padding are larger or equal to those of the kernel. The following inequality holds.
‖W ′‖2 ≤ ‖Conv‖2 ≤
√
n‖W ′‖2,
where n is a constant independent of the weight matrix.
The proof of Corollary 1 is in Appendix D.2. Lists of the Lipschitz constant of pooling layers and
activation functions are summarized in Appendix D.
5.3 Putting them together
With recursive computation using the bounds described in the previous sections, we can calculate an
upper bound of the Lipschitz constants of the whole network in a differentiable manner with respect
to network parameters. At inference time, calculation of the Lipschitz constant is required only once.
In calculations at training time, there may be some notable differences in the Lipschitz constants. For
example, σi in a batch normalization layer depends on its input. However, we empirically found that
calculating the Lipschitz constants using the same bound as inference time effectively regularizes
the Lipschitz constant. This lets us deal with batch-normalization layers, which prior work ignored
despite its impact on the Lipschitz constant [8, 41].
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Figure 3: Comparison of bounds in layers. Left: the second convolutional layer of a naive model
in Sec 6. Center: the second convolutional layer of an LMT model in Sec 6. Right: pooling layers
assuming size 2 and its input size is 28× 28.
6 Numerical evaluations
In this section, we show the results of numerical evaluations. Since our goal is to create networks
with stronger certification, we evaluated the following three points.
1. Our bounds of the Lipschitz constants are tighter than previous ones (Sec. 6.1).
2. LMT effectively enlarges the provably guarded area (Secs. 6.1 and 6.2).
3. Our calculation technique of the guarded area and LMT are available for modern large and
complex networks (Sec. 6.2).
We also evaluated the robustness of trained networks against current attacks and confirmed that LMT
robustifies networks (Secs. 6.1 and 6.2). For calculating the Lipschitz constant and guarded area, we
used Prop. 2. Detailed experimental setups are available in Appendix F. Our codes are available at
https://github.com/ytsmiling/lmt.
6.1 Tightness of bounds
We numerically validated improvements of bounds for each component and numerically analyzed the
tightness of overall bounds of the Lipschitz constant. We also see the non-triviality of the provably
guarded area. We used the same network and hyperparameters as Kolter and Wong [19].
Improvement in each component: We evaluated the difference of bounds in convolutional layers
in networks trained using a usual training procedure and LMT. Figure 3 shows comparisons between
the bounds in the second convolutional layer. It also shows the difference of bounds in pooling layers,
which does not depend on training methods. We can confirm improvement in each bound. This
results in significant differences in upper-bounds of the Lipschitz constants of the whole networks.
Analysis of tightness: Let L be an upper-bound of the Lipschitz constant calculated by our method.
Let Llocal, Lglobal be the local and global Lipschitz constants. Between them, we have the following
relationship.
Margin
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
≤
(i)
Margin
Lglobal︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
≤
(ii)
Margin
Llocal︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
≤
(iii)
Smallest Adversarial Perturbation︸ ︷︷ ︸
(D)
(5)
We analyzed errors in inequalities (i) – (iii). We define an error of (i) as (B)/(A) and others in the same
way. We used lower bounds of the local and global Lipschitz constant calculated by the maximum size
of gradients found. A detailed procedure for the calculation is explained in Appendix F.1.3. For the
generation of adversarial perturbations, we used DeepFool [24]. Note that (iii) does not hold because
we calculated mere lower bounds of Lipschitz constants in (B) and (C). We analyzed inequality (5) in
an unregularized model, an adversarially trained (AT) model with the 30-iteration C&W attack [7],
and an LMT model. Figure 4 shows the result. With an unregularized model, estimated error
ratios in (i) – (iii) were 39.9, 1.13, and 1.82 respectively. This shows that even if we could precisely
calculate the local Lipschitz constant for each data point with possibly substantial computational
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Figure 4: Comparison of error bounds using inequalities (5) with estimation. Each label corresponds
to the value in inequality (5). Left: naive model, Center: AT model, Right: LMT model.
Figure 5: Examples of pairs of an original image and an artificially perturbed image which LMT
model was ensured not to make wrong predictions. The differences between images are large and
visually perceptible. On the basis of Proposition 2, any patterns of perturbations with the same or
smaller magnitudes could not deceive the network trained with LMT.
costs, inequality (iii) becomes more than 1.8 times looser than the size of adversarial perturbations
found by DeepFool. In an AT model, the discrepancy became more than 2.4. On the other hand, in an
LMT model, estimated error ratios in (i) – (iii) were 1.42, 1.02, and 1.15 respectively. The overall
median error between the size of found adversarial perturbations, and the provably guarded area was
1.72. This shows that the trained network became smooth and Lipschitz constant based certifications
became significantly tighter when we use LMT. This also resulted in better defense against attack.
For reference, the median of found adversarial perturbations for an unregularized model was 0.97,
while the median of the size of the provably guarded area was 1.02 in an LMT model.
Size of provably guarded area: We discuss the size of the provably guarded area, which is
practically more interesting than tightness. While our algorithm has clear advantages on computational
costs and broad applicability over prior work, guarded areas that our algorithm ensured were non-
trivially large. In a naive model, the median of the size of perturbations we could certify invariance
was 0.012. This means changing several pixels by one in usual 0–255 scale cannot change their
prediction. Even though this result is not so tight as seen in the previous paragraph, this is significantly
larger than prior computationally cheap algorithm proposed by Peck et al. [30]. The more impressive
result was obtained in models trained with LMT, and the median of the guarded area was 1.02.
This corresponds to 0.036 in the `∞ norm. Kolter and Wong [19], which used the same network
and hyperparameters as ours, reported that they could defend from perturbations with its `∞-norm
bounded by 0.1 for more than 94% examples. Thus, in the `∞-norm, our work is inferior, if we ignore
their limited applicability and massive computational demands. However, our algorithm mainly
targets the `2-norm, and in that sense, the guarded area is significantly larger. Moreover, for more
than half of the test data, we could ensure that there are no one-pixel attacks [35]. To confirm the
non-triviality of the obtained certification, we have some examples of provably guarded images in
Figure 5.
6.2 Scalability test
We evaluated our method with a larger and more complex network to confirm its broad applicability
and scalability. We used 16-layered wide residual networks [42] with width factor 4 on the SVHN
dataset [27] following Cisse et al. [8]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest network
concerned with certification. We compared LMT with a naive counterpart, which uses weight decay,
spectral norm regularization [41], and Parseval networks.
Size of provably guarded area: For a model trained with LMT, we could ensure larger guarded
areas than 0.029 for more than half of test data. This order of certification was only provided for
small networks in prior work. In models trained with other methods, we could not provide such
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Table 1: Accuracy of trained wide residual networks on SVHN against C&W attack.
Size of perturbations
Clean 0.2 0.5 1.0
weight decay 98.31 72.38 20.98 2.02
Parseval network 98.30 71.35 17.92 0.94
spectral norm regularization 98.27 73.66 20.35 1.39
LMT 96.38 86.90 55.11 17.69
strong certification. There are mainly two differences between LMT and other methods. First, LMT
enlarges prediction margins. Second, LMT regularizes batch-normalization layers, while in other
methods, batch-normalization layers cancel the regularization on weight matrices and kernel of
convolutional layers. We also conducted additional experiments to provide further certification for
the network. First, we replaced convolution with kernel size 1 and stride 2 with average-pooling
with size 2 and convolution with kernel size 1. Then, we used LMT with c = 0.1. As a result, while
the accuracy dropped to 86%, the median size of the provably guarded areas was larger than 0.08.
This corresponds to that changing 400 elements of input by ±1 in usual image scales (0–255) cannot
cause error over 50% for the trained network. These certifications are non-trivial, and to the best of
our knowledge, these are the best certification provided for this large network.
Robustness against attack: We evaluated the robustness of trained networks against adversarial
perturbations created by the current attacks. We used C&W attack [7] with 100 iterations and
no random restart for evaluation. Table 1 summarizes the results. While LMT slightly dropped
its accuracy, it largely improved robustness compared to other regularization based techniques.
Since these techniques are independent of other techniques such as adversarial training or input
transformations, further robustness will be expected when LMT is combined with them.
7 Conclusion
To ensure perturbation invariance of a broad range of networks with a computationally efficient
procedure, we achieved the following.
1. We offered general and tighter spectral bounds for each component of neural networks.
2. We introduced general and fast calculation algorithm for the upper bound of operator norms
and its differentiable approximation.
3. We proposed a training algorithm which effectively constrains networks to be smooth, and
achieves better certification and robustness against attacks.
4. We successfully provided non-trivial certification for small to large networks with negligible
computational costs.
We believe that this work will serve as an essential step towards both certifiable and robust deep
learning models. Applying developed techniques to other Lipschitz-concerned domains such as
training of GAN or training with noisy labels is future work.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Prop. 1 in Sec. 4.1. Let us consider a classifier with Lipschitz constant L. Let F (X) be an
output vector of the classifier for a data point X .
The statement to prove is the following:
F (X)tX −max
i6=tX
F (X)i ≥
√
2L‖‖2 ⇒ F (X + )tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X + )i ≥ 0. (6)
If we prove the following, it suffices:
F (X + )tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X + )i ≥ F (X)tX −max
i6=tX
F (X)i −
√
2L‖‖2. (7)
Before proving inequality (7), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For real vectors x and y, the following inequality holds:
|max
i 6=tX
xi −max
i6=tX
yi| ≤ max
i 6=tX
|xi − yi|.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we assume maxi6=tX xi ≥ maxi 6=tX yi. Let j be argmaxi 6=tX xi. Then,
|max
i 6=tX
xi −max
i6=tX
yi| = max
i6=tX
xi −max
i 6=tX
yi
= xj −max
i 6=tX
yi
≤ xj − yj
≤ max
i 6=tX
|xi − yi|
Now, we can prove the inequality (7).
F (X + )tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X + )i
=F (X)tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i + (F (X + )tX − F (X)tX )−
(
max
i6=tX
F (X + )i −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i
)
≥F (X)tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i − |F (X + )tX − F (X)tX | − |max
i6=tX
F (X + )i −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i|
≥F (X)tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i − |F (X + )tX − F (X)tX | −max
i 6=tX
|F (X + )i − F (X)i|
≥F (X)tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i − max
a1,a2∈R
{
|a1|+ |a2|
∣∣∣∣√a21 + a22 ≤ L‖‖2}
=F (X)tX −max
i 6=tX
F (X)i −
√
2L‖‖2.
B Lipschitz constant of basic functionals
We prove bounds described in Sec. 5.1. Let f and g be functions with their Lipschitz constants
bounded with L1 and L2, respectively.
B.1 Composition of functions
‖f(g(X1))− f(g(X2))‖2
‖X1 −X0‖2 =
‖f(g(X1))− f(g(X2))‖2
‖g(X1)− g(X2)‖2 ·
‖g(X1)− g(X2)‖2
‖X1 −X0‖2
≤ L1 · L2.
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B.2 Addition of functions
Using triangle inequality,
‖(f + g)(X1)− (f + g)(X2))‖2
‖X1 −X0‖2 ≤
‖f(X1)− f(X2))‖2 + ‖g(X1)− g(X2)‖2
‖X1 −X0‖2
≤ L1 + L2.
B.3 Concatenation of functions
‖(f(X1), g(X1))− (f(X0), g(X0))‖2
‖X1 −X0‖2 =
√
‖(f(X1), g(X1))− (f(X0), g(X0))‖22
‖X1 −X0‖22
=
√
‖f(X1)− f(X0)‖22 + ‖g(X1)− g(X0)‖22
‖X1 −X0‖22
≤
√
L21 + L
2
2.
C Lipschitz constant of linear components
We see the Lipschitz constant of linear components, given in Sec. 5.2, in more detail. We first prove
Theorem 1, and Theorem 2. Next, we focus on its calculation for normalization layers.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Since there exists a matrix representation M of φ and the operator norm of φ in terms of `2-norm is
equivalent to the spectral norm of M , considering v = Mu is sufficient. Now, we have
1
2
∂‖v‖22
∂u
=
1
2
∂(u>M>Mu)
∂u
= M>Mu.
Thus, recursive application of the algorithm in Theorem 1 is equivalent to the power iteration to
M>M . Since the maximum eigen value ofM>M is a square of the spectral norm ofM , u converges
to the square of the spectral norm of M almost surely in the algorithm.
C.2 Explanation of Algorithm 2
We use the same notation with Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, we only care the direction of the vector
u because we normalize it at every iteration. We first explain that the direction of u converges to a
singular vector of the largest singular value of the linear function f when f is fixed.
Since
∂L
∂u
=
∂L
∂σ
· ∂σ
∂u
= 2
∂L
∂σ
· ∂σ
∂σ2
·
(
1
2
∂σ2
∂u
)
and 2∂L∂σ · ∂σ∂σ2 is a scalar, u converges to the same direction with Theorem 1. In other words, u
converges to the singular vector of the largest singular of M .
If u approximates the singular vector, then σ := ‖f(u)‖2 approximates the spectral norm of f . If f
changes a little per iteration, even though Algorithm 2 performs only one step of the power iteration
per iteration, we can keep good approximation of the spectral norm [41].
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2
From the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C.1, we considers power iteration to M>M . Let λ1 be
the largest singular value of a matrix M>M . Since M>M is a symmetric positive definite matrix,
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from Theorem 1.1 in Friedman [10], we have
λ1 −Rk ≤ 1
2
(
∆k +
√
∆k (4Rk + ∆k)
)
,
where ∆k is bounded by ω − 1 from Prop. 2.2 in [10]. A quantity ω has the following relationship
[10]:
Pr(ω − 1 ≥ n) ≤
√
2/pi.
Thus, the Theorem 2 holds.
If we use batchsize 128 for the algorithm and take the max of all upper bound, then the failure
probability is less than (2/pi)128/2 ≤ 10−12.
C.4 Calculation of normalization layers
C.4.1 Example: batch-normalization
Batch normalization applies the following function,
xi ← γi xi − µi√
σ2i + 
+ βi, (8)
where γi and βi are learnable parameters and µi, σi are the mean and deviation of (mini) batch,
respectively. Parameters and variables γi, βi, µi, and σi are constant at the inference time. Small
constant  is generally added for numerical stability. We can rewrite an update of (8) as follows:
xi ← γi√
σ2i + 
xi +
(
−γi µi√
σ2i + 
+ βi
)
.
Since the second term is constant in terms of input, it is independent of the Lipschitz constant. Thus,
we consider the following update:
xi ← γi√
σ2i + 
xi.
The Lipschitz constant can be bounded by max
i
{|γi|/
√
σ2i + }.
Since the opertion is linear, we can also use Algorithm 2 for the calculation. This allows us to
calculate the Lipschitz constant of batch-noramlization and precedent other linear layers jointly.
When we apply the algorithm 2 to a single batch-normalization layer, a numerical issue can offer.
See Appendix C.4.3 for more details.
C.4.2 Other normalizations
In weight normalization [33], the same discussion applies if we replace
√
σ2i +  in batch-
normalization with ‖wi‖2, where wi is the i-th row of a weight matrix.
C.4.3 Undesired convergence of power iteration
In some cases, estimation of spectral norm using power iteration can fail in training dynamics. For
example, in batch-normalization layer, u in Algorithm 2 converges to some one-hot vector. Once u
converges, no matter how much other parameters change during training, u stay the same. To avoid
the problem, when we apply Algorithm 2 to normalization layers, we added small perturbations on a
vector u in the algorithm at every iteration after its normalization.
D Lipschitz constant of pooling and activation
D.1 Proof of Theorem 3
First, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let vector X be a concatenation of vectors Xλ(0 ≤ λ ≤ n) and let f be a function
such that f(x) is a concatenations of vectors f(Xλ), where each fλ is a function with its Lipschitz
constant bounded by L. Then, the Lipschitz constant of f can be bounded by L.
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‖f(X)− f(Y )‖22
‖X − Y ‖22
=
∑
λ
‖fλ(Xλ)− fλ(Yλ)‖22
‖X − Y ‖22
≤
∑
λ
L2‖Xλ − Yλ‖22
‖X − Y ‖22
=L2
Since n-th time repetition is the same with n-th time concatenation, which is explained in Ap-
pendix B.3, its Lipschitz constant is bounded by
√
n. Using Appendix B.3 and the above lemma, we
obtain the bound in Theorem 3.
D.2 Proof of Corollary 1
notation: chin, chout, hk, wk: input channel size, output channel size, kernel height, kernel width.
W ′: a matrix which kernel of a convolution W ∈ Rchout×chin×hk×wk is reshaped into the size
chout × (chin × hk × wk).
proof: The operation in a convolution layer satisfies the assumption in Theorem 3, where all fi are
the matrix multiplication of W ′. Thus, the right inequality holds. Since matrix multiplication with
W ′ is applied at least once in the convolution, the left inequality holds.
This result is similar to Cisse et al. [8], but we can provide better bounds by carefully calculating the
number of repetition, given in Appendix D.3.
D.3 Tighter bound of n-repetition in Theorem 3
We provide tight number of the repetition for pooling and convolutional layers here.
notation: hin, win: height and width of input array.
hk, wk: kernel height, kernel width.
hs, ws: stride height, stride width.
number of repetition:⌈
min(hk, hin − hk + 1)
hs
⌉
·
⌈
min(wk, win − wk + 1)
ws
⌉
.
derivation: First of all, the repetition is bounded by the size of reception field, which is hk · wk.
This is provided by Cisse et al. [8]. Now, we extend the bound by considering the input size and
stride. Firstly, we consider the input size after padding. If both the input and kernel size are 8× 8, the
number of repetition is obviously bounded by 1. Similarly, the number of repetition can be bounded
by the following:
min(hk, hin − hk + 1) ·min(wk, win − wk + 1).
We can further bound the time of repetition by considering the stride as follows:⌈
min(hk, hin − hk + 1)
hs
⌉
·
⌈
min(wk, win − wk + 1)
ws
⌉
.
D.3.1 The Lipschitz constant of fi in Theorem 3 for Pooling layers
max-pooling: Lipschitz constant of max function is bounded by one.
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Table 2: Lipschitz constants of major activation functions.
Activation Lipschitz constant
ReLU 1
Leaky ReLU [22] max(1, |α|)
sigmoid 1/4
tanh 1
soft plus [5] 1
ELU [9] max(1, |α|)
average-pooling: Before bounding the Lipschitz constant, we note that the following inequality
holds for a vector X: (
n∑
i=1
Xi
)2
≤ n
n∑
i=1
X2i .
This can be proved using
1
n
n∑
i=1
X2i −
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)2
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Xi − 1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)2
≥ 0.
Now, we bound the Lipschitz constant of the average function Avg(·).
‖Avg(X)−Avg(Y )‖2
‖X − Y ‖2 =
|Avg(X − Y )|
‖X − Y ‖2
=
|
hk·wk∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi)|
‖X − Y ‖2 /(hk · wk)
≤ 1√
hk · wk
.
D.4 Activation functions
Table 2 lists up the Lipschitz constants of activation functions and other nonlinear functions commonly
used in deep neural networks. From Theorem 3, we only need to consider the Lipschitz constants
elementwisely.
E Lipschitz-Margin Training stabilization
We empirically found that applying the addition only when a prediction is correct stabilizes the
training. Thus, in the training, we scale the addition with
αF,X := min
i 6=tX
{
max
(
0,min
(
1,
F (X)tX − F (X)i√
2cLF
))}
.
Even though αF,X depends on LF , we do not back-propagate it.
Similarly, we observed that strong regularization at initial stage of training can make training unstable.
Thus, we set an initial value of c small and linearly increased it to the target value in first 5 epochs as
learning rate scheduling used in Goyal et al. [13].
F Experimental setups
In this section, we describe the details of our experimental settings.
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Table 3: Network structure used for experiment 6.1. For convolutional layers, output size denotes
channel size of output.
output size kernel padding stride
convolution 16 (4,4) (1,1) (2,2)
ReLU - - - -
convolution 32 (4,4) (1,1) (2,2)
ReLU - - - -
fully-connected 100 - - -
ReLU - - - -
fully-connected 10 - - -
F.1 Experiment 6.1
F.1.1 Base network
We used the same network, optimizer and hyperparameters with Kolter and Wong [19]. A network
consisting of two convolutional and two fully-connected layers was used. Table 3 shows the details
of its structure.
F.1.2 Hyperprameters
All models were trained using Adam optimizer [18] for 20 epochs with a batch size of 50. The
learning rate of Adam was set to 0.001. Note that these setting is the same with Kolter and Wong
[19]. For a LMT model, we set c = 1. For an AT model, we tuned hyperparemter c of C&W attack
from [0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000] and chose the best one on validation data.
F.1.3 Estimation of inequality (5)
(A): We calculated (A) with Proposition 2.
(B): We took the max of the local Lipschitz constant calculated for (C).
(C): First, we added a random perturbation which each element is sampled from a Gaussian with
zero-mean and variance v , where v is set as a reciprocal number of the size of input dimension. Next,
we calculated the size of a gradient with respect to the input. We repeated the above two for 100
times and used the maximum value between them as an estimation of the local Lipschitz constant.
(D): We used DeepFool [24].
F.2 Experiment 6.2
Wide residual network [42] with 16 layers and a width factor k = 4 was used. We sampled 10000
images from an extra data available for SVHN dataset as validation data and combined the rest with
the official training data, following Cisse et al. [8]. All inputs were preprocessed so that each element
has a value in a range 0-1.
Models were trained with Nesterov Momentum [26] for 160 epochs with a batch size of 128. The
initial learning rate was set to 0.01 and it was multiplied by 0.1 at epochs 80 and 120. For naive
models, the weight decay with λ = 0.0005 and the dropout with a dropout ratio of 0.4 were used.
For Parseval networks, the weight decay was removed except for the last fully-connected layer and
Parseval regularization with β = 0.0001 was added, following Cisse et al. [8]. For a network with
the spectral norm regularization, the weight decay was removed and the spectral norm regularization
with λ = 0.01 was used following Yoshida and Miyato [41]. We note that both Cisse et al. [8] and
Yoshida and Miyato [41] used batch-normalization for their experimental evaluations and thus, we
left it for them. For LMT, we used c = 0.01 and did not apply weight decay. In residual blocks, the
Lipschits constant for the convolutional layer and the batch normalization layer was jointly calculated
as described in Sec. 5.2.
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G Additional discussion
G.1 Application
Since the proposed calculation method of guarded areas imposes almost no computational overhead at
inference time, this property has various potential applications. First of all, we note that in real-world
applications, even though true labels are not available, we can calculate the lower bounds on the
size of perturbations needed to change the predictions. The primary use is balancing between the
computational costs and the performance. When the provably guarded areas are sufficiently large,
we can use weak and computationally cheap detectors of perturbations, because the detectors only
need to find large perturbations. For data with small guarded areas, we may resort to computationally
heavy options, e.g., strong detectors or denoising networks.
G.2 Improvements from Parseval networks
Here, we discuss the difference between our work and Cisse et al. [8]. In the formulation of Parseval
networks, the goal is to limit the change in some Lipschitz continuous loss by constraining the
Lipschitz constant. However, since the existence of adversarial perturbations corresponds to the 0-1
loss, which is not continuous, their discussion is not applicable. For example, if we add a scaling layer
to the output of a network without changing its parameters, we can control the Lipschitz constant of
the network. However, this does not change its prediction and this is irrelevant to the existence of
adversarial perturbations. Therefore, considering solely the Lipschitz constant can be insufficient. In
LMT, the insufficiency is avoided using Proposition 1 and 2.
Additionally, we point out three differences. First, in Parseval networks, the upper bound of each
component is restricted to be smaller than one. This makes their theoretical framework incompatible
with some frequently used layers such as the batch normalization layer. Since they just ignore the
effects of such layers, Parseval networks cannot control the Lipschitz constant of networks with
normalization layers. On the other hand, our calculation method of guarded area and LMT can
handle such layers without problems. Second, Parseval networks force all singular values of the
weight matrices to be close to one, meaning that Parseval networks prohibit weight matrices to dump
unnecessary features. As Wang et al. [38] pointed out, learning unnecessary features can be a cause
of adversarial perturbations, which indicates the orthonormality condition has adverse effects that
encourage the existence of adversarial perturbations. Since LMT does not penalize small singular
values, LMT does not suffer the problem. Third, LMT requires only differentiable bounds of the
Lipschitz constants. This lets LMT be easily extended to networks with various components. On the
other hand, the framework of Parseval networks requires special optimization techniques for each
component.
G.3 Extensions of LMT
The formulation of LMT is highly flexible, so we can consider some extended versions. First, we
consider the applications that require guarded area different in classes. For example, to distinguish
humans from cats will be more important than to classify Angora cats from Persian cats. In LMT,
such knowledge can be combined by specifying different hyperparameter c for each pair of classes.
Second, we consider a combination of adversarial trainings. It will be more reasonable to require
smaller margins for the inputs with large perturbations. In LMT, we can incorporate this intuition
by changing c according to the size of perturbations or merely set c to zero for perturbed data. This
ability of LMT to be easily combined with other notions is one of the advantages of LMT.
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